A class of population dynamics for reaching epsilon-equilibria: Engineering applications
American Control Conference (ACC)
Quijano Silva, Nicanor
This document proposes a novel class of population dynamics that are parameterized by a nonnegative scalar epsilon. We show that any rest point of the proposed dynamics corresponds to an epsilon-equilibrium of the underlying population game. In order to derive this class of population dynamics, our approach is twofold. First, we use an extension of the pairwise comparison revision protocol and the classic mean dynamics for well-mixed populations. This approach requires full-information. Second, we employ the same revision protocol and a version of the mean dynamics for non-well-mixed populations that uses only local information. Furthermore, invariance properties of the set of allowed population states are analyzed, and stability of the epsilon-equilibria is formally proved. Finally, two engineering examples based on the epsilon-dynamics are presented: A control scenario in which noisy measurements should be mitigated, and a humanitarian engineering application related to wealth distribution in poor societies.
game theory, epsilon-equilibria, population dynamics, imperfect information, humanitarian engineering
G. Obando, J. Barreiro-Gomez and N. Quijano. A class of population dynamics for reaching epsilon-equilibria: Engineering applications, 2016 American Control Conference, 2016, Boston, MA, pp. 4713-4718.